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Abstract. A new semantics with the finite model property is provided
and used to establish decidability for Go¨del modal logics based on (crisp
or fuzzy) Kripke frames combined locally with Go¨del logic. A similar
methodology is also used to establish decidability, and indeed co-NP-
completeness for a Go¨del S5 logic that coincides with the one-variable
fragment of first-order Go¨del logic.
1 Introduction
Go¨del modal logics combine Kripke frames of modal logics with the semantics of
the well-known fuzzy (and intermediate) Go¨del logic. These logics, in particular,
analogues GK (for “fuzzy” frames) and GKC (for “crisp” frames) of the modal
logic K, have been investigated in some detail by Caicedo and Rodr´ıguez [7, 6]
and Metcalfe and Olivetti [13, 14]. More general approaches, focussing mainly
on finite-valued modal logics, have been developed by Fitting [9, 10], Priest [15],
and Bou et al. [4]. Multimodal variants of GK have also been proposed as the
basis for fuzzy description logics in [12] and (restricting to finite models) [3].
Axiomatizations were obtained for the box and diamond fragments of GK
(where the box fragments of GK and GKC coincide) in [7] and for the diamond
fragment of GKC in [14]. It was subsequently shown in [6] that the full logic GK
is axiomatized either by adding the Fischer Servi axioms for intuitionistic modal
logic IK (see [8]) to the union of the axioms for both fragments, or by adding the
prelinearity axiom for Go¨del logic to IK. Decidability of the diamond fragment
of GK was established in [7], using the fact that the fragment has the finite
model property with respect to its Kripke semantics. This finite model property
fails for the box fragment of GK and GKC and the diamond fragment of GKC,
but decidability and PSPACE-completeness for these fragments was established
in [13, 14] using analytic Gentzen-style proof systems.
The first main contribution of this paper is to establish the decidability of
validity in full GK and GKC by providing an alternative Kripke semantics for
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these logics that have the same valid formulas as the original semantics, but
also admit the finite model property. The key idea of the new semantics is to
restrict evaluations of modal formulas at a given world to a particular finite set of
truth values. We then use a similar strategy to establish decidability, and indeed
co-NP completeness, for the crisp Go¨del modal logic GS5C based on S5 frames
where accessibility is an equivalence relation. Moreover, this logic, an extension
of the intuitionistic modal logic MIPC of Bull [5] and Prior [16] with prelinearity
and a further modal axiom, corresponds exactly to the one-variable fragment of
first-order Go¨del logic (see [11]).
2 Go¨del Modal Logics
Go¨del modal logics are defined based on a language L♦ consisting of a fixed
countably infinite set Var of (propositional) variables, denoted p, q, . . ., binary
connectives →, ∧, ∨, constants ⊥, >, and unary operators  and ♦. The set of
formulas Fml♦, with arbitrary members denoted ϕ,ψ, χ, . . . is defined induc-
tively as usual, as are subformulas of formulas. We call formulas of the form ϕ
and ♦ϕ box-formulas and diamond-formulas, respectively, and fix the length of
a formula ϕ, denoted `(ϕ), to be the number of symbols occurring in ϕ. We also
define ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥ and let Var(ϕ) denote the set of all variables occurring in
the formula ϕ.
The standard semantics of Go¨del logic is characterized by the Go¨del t-norm
min and its residuum →G, defined on the real unit interval [0, 1] by
x→G y =
{
y if x > y
1 otherwise.
The Go¨del modal logics GK and GKC are defined semantically as generalizations
of the modal logic K where connectives behave at a given world as in Go¨del logic.
A fuzzy Kripke frame is a pair F = 〈W,R〉 where W is a non-empty set of
worlds and R : W ×W → [0, 1] is a binary fuzzy accessibility relation on W . If
Rxy ∈ {0, 1} for all x, y ∈W , then R is called crisp and F, a crisp Kripke frame.
In this case, we often write R ⊆W ×W and Rxy to mean Rxy = 1.
A GK-model is a triple M = 〈W,R, V 〉, where 〈W,R〉 is a fuzzy Kripke
frame and V : Var ×W → [0, 1] is a mapping, called a valuation, extended to
V : Fml♦ ×W→ [0, 1] as follows:
V (⊥, x) = 0
V (>, x) = 1
V (ϕ→ ψ, x) = V (ϕ, x)→G V (ψ, x)
V (ϕ ∧ ψ, x) = min(V (ϕ, x), V (ψ, x))
V (ϕ ∨ ψ, x) = max(V (ϕ, x), V (ψ, x))
V (ϕ, x) = inf{Rxy →G V (ϕ, y) : y ∈W}
V (♦ϕ, x) = sup{min(Rxy, V (ϕ, y)) : y ∈W}.
A GKC-model satisfies the extra condition that 〈W,R〉 is a crisp Kripke frame.
In this case, the conditions for  and ♦ may also be read as
V (ϕ, x) = inf({1} ∪ {V (ϕ, y) : Rxy})
V (♦ϕ, x) = sup({0} ∪ {V (ϕ, y) : Rxy}).
A formula ϕ ∈ Fml♦ is valid in a GK-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 if V (ϕ, x) = 1 for
all x ∈ W . If ϕ is valid in all L-models for some logic L (in particular GK or
GKC), then ϕ is said to be L-valid, written |=L ϕ.
It is shown in [7] that validity in the box and diamond fragments of GK are
axiomatized by extending any axiom system for Go¨del logic (e.g., intuitionistic
logic plus the prelinearity axiom (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)) with, respectively:
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ) and ♦(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (♦ϕ ∨ ♦ψ)
¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ ♦¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬♦ψ
ϕ / ϕ ¬♦⊥
ϕ→ ψ / ♦ϕ→ ♦ψ.
Moreover, it was shown in [6] that extending the union of these axiomatizations
with the following Fischer Servi axioms (see [8]) axiomatizes the full logic GK
(equivalently, extending the intuitionistic modal logic IK with prelinearity):
♦(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ♦ψ)
(♦ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ).
The box fragment of GKC coincides with the box fragment of GK [7], while
the diamond fragment of GKC is axiomatized by adding the rule χ ∨ (ϕ →
ψ) / ♦χ ∨ (♦ϕ → ♦ψ) to the diamond fragment of GK [14]. No axiomatization
has yet been found for the full logic GKC.
Let us agree to call a model finite if its set of worlds is finite, and say that a
logic has the finite model property if validity in the logic coincides with validity in
all finite models of the logic. In [7], it is shown that the formula ¬¬p→ ¬¬p
is valid in all finite GK-models, but not in the infinite crisp model 〈N, R, V 〉
where Rxy = 1 for all x, y ∈ N and V (p, x) = 1/(x + 1) for all x ∈ N. That
is, neither GK nor GKC has the finite model property. The diamond fragment of
GK (but not of GKC) does have the finite model property and this can be used
to show that validity in the fragment is decidable [7]. Decidability and indeed
PSPACE-completeness of validity in the box and diamond fragments of both GK
and GKC was established in [13, 14] using analytic Gentzen-style proof systems.
However, decidability of validity in the full logics GK and GKC has not as yet
been established, and indeed will be the main goal of the following two sections.
3 A New Semantics and Finite Model Property
In order for a GKC-model to render the formula ϕ = ¬¬p → ¬¬p invalid
at a world x, there must be values of p at worlds accessible to x that form an
infinite descending sequence tending to but never reaching 0. This ensures that
the infinite model falsifies ϕ, but also that no particular world acts as a “witness”
to the value of p. Our strategy in what follows will be to redefine models to
allow only a finite number of values at each world that can be taken by box-
formulas and diamond-formulas. A formula such as p can then be “witnessed”
at a world where the value of p is merely “sufficiently close” to the value of p.
Let us define a GFK-model as a quadruple M = 〈W,R, T, V 〉, where 〈W,R, V 〉
is a GK-model and T : W → P<ω([0, 1]) is a function from worlds to finite sets
of truth values satisfying {0, 1} ⊆ T (x) ⊆ [0, 1] for all x ∈ W . If 〈W,R, V 〉 is
also a GKC-model, then M will be called a GFKC-model.
The GFK-valuation V is extended to formulas using the same clauses for
non-modal connectives as for GK-valuations, together with the revised modal
connective clauses:
V (ϕ, x) = max{r ∈ T (x) : r ≤ inf{Rxy →G V (ϕ, y) : y ∈W}}
V (♦ϕ, x) = min{r ∈ T (x) : r ≥ sup{min(Rxy, V (ϕ, y)) : y ∈W}}.
As before, a formula ϕ ∈ Fml♦ is valid in a GFK-model M = 〈W,R, T, V 〉 if
V (ϕ, x) = 1 for all x ∈W , written M |=GFK ϕ.
Observe now that for the formula ϕ = ¬¬p→ ¬¬p, there are very simple
finite GFKC-counter-models: for example, M0 = 〈W,R, T, V 〉 with W = {a},
Raa = 1, T (a) = {0, 1}, and V (p, a) = 12 . It is easy to see that V (¬p, a) = 0,
Raa →G V (¬¬p, a) = 1, and so V (¬¬p, a) = 1. Moreover, V (p, a) = 0
(since Raa →G V (p, a) = 12 , and 0 is the next smaller element of T (a)); hence
V (¬p, a) = 1 and V (¬¬p, a) = 0. So 1 = V (¬¬p, a) > V (¬¬p, a) = 0 and
M0 2GFKC ¬¬p→ ¬¬p.
Of course, such an observation is useful only if the new semantics character-
izes the same logics. For convenience, let us agree to write WM, RM, TM, and
VM for, respectively, the set of worlds, accessibility relation, truth value function,
and valuation function of an L-model M where L ∈ {GK,GKC,GFK,GFKC}. In
the next section, we prove the following:
Theorem 1. For each ϕ ∈ Fml♦:
(a) |=GK ϕ iff |=GFK ϕ iff ϕ is valid in all GFK-models M satisfying
|WM| ≤ (`(ϕ) + 2)`(ϕ) and |TM(x)| ≤ `(ϕ) + 2 for all x ∈WM.
(b) |=GKC ϕ iff |=GFKC ϕ iff ϕ is valid in all GFKC-models M satisfying
|WM| ≤ (`(ϕ) + 2)`(ϕ) and |TM(x)| ≤ `(ϕ) + 2 for all x ∈WM.
For decidability, we then reason as follows. Observe first that for any finite GFK-
model M and formula ϕ, the values taken by the subformulas of ϕ and the fuzzy
accessibility relation RM are contained in the finite set
U =
⋃
x∈WM
({VM(p, x) : p ∈ Var(ϕ)} ∪ {RMxy : y ∈WM} ∪ TM(x)).
Moreover, using Lemma 1(c) below, we may assume without loss of generality
that U = {0, 1|U |−1 , . . . , |U |−2|U |−1 , 1}. Hence, by Theorem 1, to check whether ϕ is
GK-valid or GKC-valid, it suffices to consider finitely many different finite GFK-
models or GFKC-models M (with |WM| ≤ (`(ϕ) + 2)`(ϕ)). So we obtain:
Theorem 2. Validity in GK and GKC are decidable.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
We begin by fixing some useful notation. For a fuzzy Kripke frame 〈W,R〉, we
define a crisp relation R+ = {(x, y) ∈ W 2 : Rxy > 0} and let R+[x] = {y ∈ W :
R+xy} for each x ∈W .
We call 〈W ′, R′〉 a subframe of 〈W,R〉, written 〈W ′, R′〉 ⊆ 〈W,R〉, if W ′ ⊆W
and R′ is R restricted to W ′. A submodel M̂ of a model M is based on a subframe
〈W
M̂
, R
M̂
〉 ⊆ 〈WM, RM〉, with TM̂ (if appropriate) and VM̂ being, respectively,
TM and VM restricted to WM̂. In particular, given X ⊆ WM, the submodel of
M generated by X is the smallest submodel M̂ of M satisfying X ⊆ W
M̂
and
for all x ∈W
M̂
, if y ∈ R+M[x] then y ∈WM̂. Also, M will be called a tree-model
if 〈WM, R+M〉 is a tree, and the height hg(M) of M is the height of 〈WM, R+M〉
(possibly ∞).
Parts (a) and (b) of the following lemma generalize well-known results for the
modal logic K (see, e.g., [2]), while part (c) generalizes a useful result from [14]
(Lemma 3.1). Their proofs will be omitted here, but follow very closely the ideas
of the previous proofs from the references.
Lemma 1. Let L ∈ {GK,GKC,GFK,GFKC} and let M be an L-model.
(a) Given any generated submodel M̂ of M, V
M̂
(ϕ, x) = VM(ϕ, x) for all x ∈
W
M̂
, and ϕ ∈ Fml♦.
(b) Given x0 ∈ WM and ϕ ∈ Fml♦, there is an L-tree-model M̂ with root x̂0
and hg(M̂) ≤ `(ϕ) satisfying V
M̂
(ϕ, x̂0) = VM(ϕ, x0).
(c) Given an order-embedding h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] satisfying h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1,
consider M̂ with W
M̂
= WM, RM̂xy = h(RMxy), TM̂(x) = h(TM(x)), and
V
M̂
(p, x) = h(VM(p, x)) for all x, y ∈ WM and p ∈ Var. Then VM̂(ϕ, x) =
h(VM(ϕ, x)) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦ and x ∈WM.
Note that the tree in (b), although it is of finite height, can still be infinitely
branching and thus contain infinitely many nodes (i.e., worlds).
We now provide the key construction of a GK-tree-model taking the same
values for formulas at its root as a given GFK-tree-model. Note first that the
original GFK-model without the function T cannot play this role in general
since the infimum or supremum required for calculating the value of a box or
diamond formula might not be in the set T (x0) (where x0 is the root world).
This problem is resolved by taking infinitely many order-isomorphic copies of the
original GFK-model (without T ) in such a way that the open intervals between
members of T (x0) are “squeezed” closer to either their lower or upper bounds.
The obtained infima and suprema will then coincide with the next smaller or
larger member of T (x0), that is, the required values of the formulas at x0 in the
original GFK-model.
Lemma 2. For any GFK-tree-model M = 〈W,R, T, V 〉 of finite height with root
x0, there is a GK-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with root x̂0, such that V̂ (ϕ, x̂0) =
V (ϕ, x0) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦. Moreover, if M is crisp, then so is M̂.
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on hg(M). The base case hg(M) = 0
is immediate, fixing M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with Ŵ = W = {x0}, R̂ = R = ∅, and
V̂ = V . For the inductive step hg(M) = n + 1, define for all y ∈ R+[x0],
My = 〈Wy, Ry, Ty, Vy〉 as the submodel of M generated by {y}. That is, My is a
GFK-tree-model of finite height with root y, hg(My) ≤ n, and, by Lemma 1(a),
Vy(ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all x ∈Wy and ϕ ∈ Fml♦. So, by the induction hypothe-
sis, for each y ∈ R+[x0], there is a GK-tree-model M̂y = 〈Ŵy, R̂y, V̂y〉 (crisp if M
is crisp) with root ŷ such that V̂y(ϕ, ŷ) = Vy(ϕ, y) (= V (ϕ, y)) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦.
We now define infinitely many copies of our models M̂y such that at each
copy, all the values of our formulas (and fuzzy accessibility relation) get “squeezed”
closer and closer towards the next smaller (or next larger) element of T (x0). This
is achieved by defining for each k ∈ Z+, an order-embedding (using Lemma 1(c))
that “squeezes” the open interval between two members αi and αi+1 of T (x0)
into the interval (αi, αi +
1
k ) (or (αi+1− 1k , αi+1)), which gets infinitely small as
k approaches infinity.
More formally, consider T (x0) = {α1, . . . , αm} with 0 = α1 < . . . < αm = 1
and define a family of order-embeddings {hk}k∈Z+ from [0, 1] into [0, 1] satisfying
hk(0) = 0 and hk(1) = 1, such that
hk(αi) = αi for all i ≤ m and k ∈ Z+
hk[(αi, αi+1)] = (αi,min(αi +
1
k , αi+1)) for all i ≤ m− 1 and even k ∈ Z+
hk[(αi, αi+1)] = (max(αi, αi+1 − 1k ), αi+1) for all i ≤ m− 1 and odd k ∈ Z+.
Furthermore, for each y ∈ R+[x0] and k ∈ Z+, we define a GK-model M̂ky =
〈Ŵ ky , R̂ky , V̂ ky 〉 such that for each k ∈ Z+ and y ∈ R+[x0]:
(1) Ŵ ky is a copy of Ŵy with distinct worlds, where x̂
k
y is the corresponding copy
of x̂y (the root is denoted by ŷ
k)
(2) R̂ky x̂
k
y ẑ
k
y = hk(R̂yx̂y ẑy), for all x̂
k
y , ẑ
k
y ∈ Ŵ ky
(3) V̂ ky (ϕ, x̂
k
y) = hk(V̂y(ϕ, x̂y)) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦ and x̂ky ∈ Ŵ ky .
Note that for all y ∈ R+[x0], x̂y, ẑy ∈ Ŵy, and ϕ ∈ Fml♦, if R̂yx̂y ẑy →G
V̂y(ϕ, x̂y) ∈ (αi, αi+1), then R̂ky x̂ky ẑky →G V̂ ky (ϕ, x̂ky) ∈ (αi, αi + 1k ), for each even
k ∈ Z+, and if min(R̂yx̂y ẑy, V̂y(ϕ, x̂y)) ∈ (αi, αi+1), then min(R̂ky x̂ky ẑky , V̂ ky (ϕ, x̂ky))
∈ (αi+1 − 1k , αi+1), for each odd k ∈ Z+.
We now define the GK-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with
Ŵ =
⋃
y∈R+[x0]
⋃
k∈Z+ Ŵ
k
y ∪ {x̂0}
R̂xz =

hk(Rx0y) if x = x̂0 and z = ŷ
k for some y ∈ R+[x0] and k ∈ Z+
R̂kyxz if x, z ∈ Ŵ ky for some y ∈ R+[x0] and k ∈ Z+
0 otherwise
V̂ (p, x) =
{
V (p, x0) if x = x̂0
V̂ ky (p, x) if x ∈ Ŵ ky for some y ∈ R+[x0] and k ∈ Z+.
If M is crisp, then for all y ∈ R+[x0], M̂y is crisp and so also are M̂ky for all
k ∈ Z+. Hence, by construction, M̂ is crisp. Moreover, V̂ ky (ϕ, x̂ky) = V̂ (ϕ, x̂ky) for
all ϕ ∈ Fml♦ and x̂ky ∈ Ŵ \ {x̂0}.
Now we prove that V̂ (ϕ, x̂0) = V (ϕ, x0) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦, proceeding by
induction on `(ϕ). The base case `(ϕ) = 1 follows directly from the definition of
V̂ . For the inductive step, the cases for the non-modal connectives follow easily
using the induction hypothesis. Let us just consider the case ϕ = ψ, the case
ϕ = ♦ψ being very similar. There are two possibilities. Suppose first that
V (ψ, x0) = max{r ∈ T (x0) : r ≤ inf{Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) : y ∈W}} = 1.
Then for all y ∈ R+[x0], Rx0y ≤ V (ψ, y) and by Lemma 1(a), V (ψ, y) =
Vy(ψ, y) = V̂y(ψ, ŷ). Thus Rx0y ≤ V̂y(ψ, ŷ) and therefore, for all k ∈ Z+ and
y ∈ R+[x0],
R̂x̂0ŷ
k = hk(Rx0y) ≤ hk(V̂y(ψ, ŷ)) = V̂ ky (ψ, ŷk) = V̂ (ψ, ŷk).
It follows that
V̂ (ψ, x̂0) = inf{R̂x̂0z →G V̂ (ψ, z) : z ∈ Ŵ} = 1 = V (ψ, x0).
Now suppose that V (ψ, x0) = αi < 1 for some i ≤ m − 1. Then Rx0z →G
V (ψ, z) ≥ αi for all z ∈W , and thus, (?), R̂x̂0z →G V̂ (ψ, z) ≥ αi for all z ∈ Ŵ ,
by construction using the order-embeddings {hk}k∈Z+ .
There are two subcases. First, suppose that there is at least one y ∈W such
that Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) = αi; call it y0. This means that Rx0y0 > V (ψ, y0) = αi
and for all k ∈ Z+, V̂ (ψ, ŷk0 ) = V̂ ky0(ψ, ŷk0 ) = hk(V̂y0(ψ, ŷ0)) = hk(Vy0(ψ, y0)) =
hk(V (ψ, y0)) = hk(αi) = αi. Since Rx0y > αi, also for all k ∈ Z+, R̂x̂0ŷk0 =
hk(Rx0y0) > αi = V̂ (ψ, ŷ
k
0 ), and hence, using (?),
V̂ (ψ, x̂0) = inf{R̂x̂0z →G V̂ (ψ, z) : z ∈ Ŵ} = αi = V (ψ, x0).
Now suppose that Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) > αi for all y ∈ W . Since V (ψ, x0) =
max{r ∈ T (x0) : r ≤ inf{Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) : y ∈ W}} = αi, there is at least
one y ∈ W such that Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) ∈ (αi, αi+1); call it y0. Then, by con-
struction, for any ε > 0 there is a k ∈ Z+ such that hk(Rx0y0 →G V (ψ, y0)) =
hk(Rx0y0)→G hk(V (ψ, y0)) = R̂x̂0ŷk0 →G V̂ (ψ, ŷk0 ) ∈ (αi, αi + ε). Using (?),
V̂ (ψ, x̂0) = inf{R̂x̂0z →G V̂ (ψ, z) : z ∈ Ŵ} = αi = V (ψ, x0). uunionsq
A subset Σ ⊆ Fml♦ will be called a fragment iff it is closed with respect
to taking subformulas and contains ⊥ and >. For a formula ϕ ∈ Fml♦, we let
Σ(ϕ) be the smallest fragment containing ϕ. Clearly, |Σ(ϕ)| ≤ `(ϕ) + 2.
We now show that given any finite fragment Σ and GK-tree-model M, we are
able to “prune” (i.e., remove branches from) M and introduce a suitable function
T to obtain a finite GFK-tree-model M̂ such that the evaluations of formulas in
Σ at the roots of M and M̂ coincide.
Lemma 3. Let Σ ⊆ Fml♦ be a finite fragment. Then for any GK-tree-model
M = 〈W,R, V 〉 of finite height with root x0, there is a finite GFK-tree-model
M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, T̂ , V̂ 〉 with 〈Ŵ , R̂〉 ⊆ 〈W,R〉, root x0 ∈ Ŵ , |Ŵ | ≤ |Σ|hg(M), and
|T̂ (x)| ≤ |Σ| for all x ∈ Ŵ , such that V̂ (ϕ, x0) = V (ϕ, x0) for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
Moreover, if M is crisp, then so is M̂.
Proof. Let Σ be the set of all box-formulas in Σ, Σ♦ the set of all diamond-
formulas in Σ, and ΣVar the set of all variables in Σ. Let us also define Vx[∆] =
{V (ϕ, x) : ϕ ∈ ∆} for any x ∈ W and ∆ ⊆ Fml♦. We prove the lemma by
induction on hg(M). For the base case, it suffices to define Ŵ = W , R̂ = R = ∅,
V̂ = V , and T̂ (x0) = {0, 1}.
For the induction step hg(M) = n + 1, consider for each y ∈ R+[x0], the
submodel My = 〈Wy, Ry, Vy〉 of M generated by {y}. It is clear that each My
is a GK-tree-model of finite height with root y and hg(My) ≤ n. Hence, by
the induction hypothesis, for each y ∈ R+[x0] there is a finite GFK-tree model
M̂y = 〈Ŵy, R̂y, T̂y, V̂y〉 with 〈Ŵy, R̂y〉 ⊆ 〈Wy, Ry〉 and root y, such that for all
ϕ ∈ Σ: V̂y(ϕ, y) = Vy(ϕ, y) (= V (ϕ, y)). Moreover, we know for all y ∈ R+[x0]
that |Ŵy| ≤ |Σ|n and |T̂y(x)| ≤ |Σ| for all x ∈ Ŵy.
We now choose a finite number of appropriate y ∈ R+[x0] in order to build
our finite GFK-model. To this end, note that we can view Vx0 [Σ ∪Σ♦] ∪ {0, 1}
as a finite set {α1, . . . , αm} with 0 = α1 < . . . < αm = 1. Then, for each
ψ ∈ Σ, such that V (ψ, x0) = αi < 1, choose a y = yψ ∈ R+[x0] such that
Rx0yψ →G V (ψ, yψ) < αi+1, and for each ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦, such that V (♦ψ, x) =
αi > 0, choose a y = y♦ψ ∈ R+[x0] such that min(Rx0y♦ψ, V (ψ, y♦ψ)) > αi−1.
Then let Y = {yψ ∈ R+[x0] : ψ ∈ Σ} ∪ {y♦ψ ∈ R[x0] : ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦}, noting
that Y is finite and |Y | ≤ |Σ ∪ Σ♦|.
Now we define M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, T̂ , V̂ 〉 with Ŵ = ⋃y∈Y Ŵy ∪ {x0} and
R̂xz =

Rx0z, if x = x0 and z ∈ R+[x0]
R̂yxz if x, z ∈ Ŵy, for some y ∈ Y
0 otherwise
T̂ (x) =
{
Vx0 [Σ ∪ Σ♦] ∪ {0, 1} if x = x0
T̂y(x), if x ∈ Ŵy for some y ∈ Y
V̂ (p, x) =
{
V (p, x0) if x = x0
V̂y(p, x) if x ∈ Ŵy, for some y ∈ Y.
Note that, since for all y ∈ W , 〈Ŵy, R̂y〉 ⊆ 〈Wy, Ry〉 ⊆ 〈W,R〉, it follows that
〈Ŵy, R̂y〉 ⊆ 〈Ŵ , R̂〉 ⊆ 〈W,R〉 for all y ∈ Y . Furthermore, because Ŵy is finite for
all y ∈ Y ⊆W , Ŵ is finite. Therefore, it is clear that, (?), R̂+[x0] = Y ⊆ R+[x0]
and for all y ∈ Y , R̂x0y = Rx0y and V̂ (ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y). Then, by an induction
on the length of ϕ, we further show that for all ϕ ∈ Σ: V̂ (ϕ, x0) = V (ϕ, x0).
The base case follows directly from the definition of V̂ . For the inductive step,
let ϕ ∈ Σ be of the form ϕ = ψ (the non-modal cases follow directly, using
the induction hypothesis). We need to consider two cases. First, let Rx0y →G
V (ψ, y) = 1 for all y ∈ R+[x0]. This implies that for all y ∈ R+[x0]: Rx0y ≤
V (ψ, y), and by (?), that R̂x0y →G V̂ (ψ, y) = 1 for all y ∈ R̂+[x0] and thus for
all y ∈ Ŵ . Because 1 ∈ T̂ (x0), we conclude that
V̂ (ψ, x0) = max{r ∈ T̂ (x0) : r ≤ inf{R̂x0y →G V̂ (ψ, y) : y ∈ Ŵ}} = 1.
For the second case, let V (ψ, x0) = inf{Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) : y ∈ W} = αi < 1
for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, call it i0. By (?), it follows that for all y ∈ Ŵ ,
R̂x0y →G V̂ (ψ, y) = Rx0y →G V (ψ, y). Because Ŵ ⊆ W , this implies that
inf{R̂x0y →G V̂ (ψ, y) : y ∈ Ŵ} ≥ inf{Rx0y →G V (ψ, y) : y ∈ W} = αi0 .
Furthermore, because of our choice of yψ ∈ Ŵ , we know that R̂x0yψ →G
V̂ (ψ, yψ) = Rx0yψ →G V (ψ, yψ) < αi0+1. Thus αi0 ≤ inf{R̂x0y →G
V̂ (ψ, y) : y ∈ Ŵ} < αi0+1 and, by the construction of T̂ (T̂ (x0) = {α1, . . . , αm}),
V̂ (ψ, x) = max{r ∈ T̂ (x0) : r ≤ inf{R̂x0y →G V̂ (ψ, y) : y ∈ Ŵ}} = αi0 .
The diamond-case case follows similarly to the box-case and is therefore omitted.
Note also that since 〈Ŵ , R̂〉 ⊆ 〈W,R〉, crispness is clearly preserved. Finally, we
note that |Ŵ | ≤ |Y ||Σ|n + 1 ≤ |Σ||Σ|n = |Σ|hg(M) and |T̂ (x0)| ≤ |Σ ∪Σ♦|+ 2,
thus |T̂ (x)| ≤ |Σ| for all x ∈ Ŵ . This concludes the induction on the height of
the model and therefore the proof of Lemma 3. uunionsq
We now have all the tools required to prove Theorem 1. Suppose first that
6|=GFK ϕ. By Lemma 1(b), ϕ is not valid in a GFK-tree model of finite height, and
hence, by Lemma 2, 6|=GK ϕ. Conversely, suppose that 6|=GK ϕ. By Lemma 1(b), ϕ
is not valid in a GK-tree model M with hg(M) ≤ `(ϕ). But then, by Lemma 3, ϕ
is not valid in a GFK-tree model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, T̂ , V̂ 〉 with (since |Σ(ϕ)| ≤ `(ϕ)+2)
|Ŵ | ≤ (`(ϕ) + 2)`(ϕ) and |T̂ (x)| ≤ `(ϕ) + 2 for all x ∈ Ŵ . This completes the
reasoning for (a), and (b) follows in exactly the same manner, using the fact
that Lemmas 2 and 3 preserve crispness.
5 A Crisp Go¨del S5 Logic
The crisp Go¨del modal logic GS5C is characterized by validity in GKC-models
where R is an equivalence relation. In fact, it is easily seen that GS5C-validity
corresponds to validity in universal GS5C-models where all worlds are related
(i.e., GKC-models M where RM = WM ×WM). Such models may be written
M = 〈W,V 〉 with simplified valuation clauses
V (ϕ, x) = inf{V (ϕ, y) : y ∈W} and V (♦ϕ, x) = sup{V (ϕ, y) : y ∈W}.
GS5C can be axiomatized as an extension of the intuitionistic modal logic MIPC [5,
16] with prelinearity and (ϕ ∨ ψ) → (ϕ ∨ ψ) [6]. It may also be viewed
as the one-variable fragment of first-order Go¨del logic G∀ (see [11]). Given a
formula ϕ ∈ Fml♦, let ϕ∗ be the first-order formula obtained by replacing each
propositional variable p with the predicate P (x),  with ∀x, and ♦ with ∃x.
Then |=GS5C ϕ if and only if |=G∀ ϕ∗. Similarly, if ϕ is a first-order formula with
one variable, let ϕ◦ be the modal formula obtained by replacing each P (x) with
p, ∀x with , and ∃x with ♦. Then |=G∀ ϕ if and only if |=GS5C ϕ◦.
We define a GFS5C-model as a GFKC-model M = 〈W,R, T, V 〉 such that
〈W,R, V 〉 is a GS5C-model, and also T (x) = T (y) whenever Rxy. Again, GFS5C-
validity amounts to validity in universal GFS5C-models, written M = 〈W,T, V 〉,
where T may now be understood as a single fixed finite subset of [0, 1], and
V (ϕ, x) = max{r ∈ T : r ≤ inf{V (ϕ, y) : y ∈W}}
V (♦ϕ, x) = min{r ∈ T : r ≥ sup{V (ϕ, y) : y ∈W}}.
Note in particular that in both GS5C-models and GFS5C-models, the truth values
of box-formulas and diamond-formulas are independent of the world.
Lemma 4. For any universal GFS5C-model M, there is a universal GS5C-model
M̂ with WM ⊆ WM̂, such that VM̂(ϕ, x) = VM(ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦ and
x ∈WM.
Proof. We proceed similarly to the proof of Lemma 2, but since there is no
accessibility relation here, an induction is not required. Given a universal GFS5C-
model M, we construct the universal GS5C-model M̂ directly by taking infinitely
many copies of M. Consider TM = {α1, . . . , αn} with 0 = α1 < . . . < αn = 1
and, using Lemma 1(c), define a family of order-embeddings {hk}k∈Z+ exactly
as in the proof of Lemma 2. For all k ∈ Z+, we define a universal GS5C-model
M̂k = 〈Ŵk, V̂k〉 such that each Ŵk is a copy of WM with distinct worlds and
V̂k(ϕ, xk) = hk(VM(ϕ, x)) for each copy xk of x ∈WM and ϕ ∈ Fml♦. We also
let Ŵ0 = WM and V̂0 = VM. Then M̂ = 〈Ŵ , V̂ 〉 where
Ŵ =
⋃
k∈N
Ŵk and V̂ (p, x) = V̂k(p, x) for x ∈ Ŵk.
It then suffices to prove that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Fml♦ and x ∈ W ,
proceeding by an induction on `(ϕ) similar to the proof of Lemma 2. uunionsq
Lemma 5. Let Σ ⊆ Fml♦ be a finite fragment. Then, for any universal GS5C-
model M, there is a finite universal GFS5C-model M̂ with W
M̂
⊆WM, such that
V
M̂
(ϕ, x) = VM(ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ and x ∈WM̂. Moreover, |WM̂|+|TM̂| ≤ 2|Σ|.
Proof. Let Σ ⊆ Fml♦ be a finite fragment, M = 〈W,V 〉 a universal GS5C-
model, and fix x0 ∈ W . First, define Σ, Σ♦, ΣVar, and Vx[∆] as in Lemma 3
and let Vx0 [Σ ∪ Σ♦] ∪ {0, 1} = {α1, . . . , αn} with 0 = α1 < . . . < αn = 1. As
in Lemma 3, we choose a finite number of y ∈W . For each ψ ∈ Σ such that
V (ψ, x0) = αi < 1, choose a y = yψ ∈ W such that V (ψ, yψ) < αi+1, and
for each ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦, such that V (♦ψ, x0) = αi > 0, choose a y = y♦ψ ∈ W such
that V (ψ, y♦ψ) > αi−1. Then let Ŵ = {x0} ∪ {yψ ∈ W : ψ ∈ Σ} ∪ {y♦ψ ∈
W : ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦}. Clearly Ŵ ⊆ W is finite. We define M̂ = 〈Ŵ , T̂ , V̂ 〉 where
T̂ = Vx0 [Σ∪Σ♦]∪{0, 1}, and V̂ is V restricted to Ŵ . It then follows by induction
on `(ϕ) (omitted here) as in Lemma 3 that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all x ∈ Ŵ and
ϕ ∈ Σ. Moreover, |Ŵ | ≤ |Σ ∪Σ♦|+ 1 ≤ |Σ| and |T̂ | ≤ |Σ ∪Σ♦|+ 2 ≤ |Σ|, and
therefore |Ŵ |+ |T̂ | ≤ 2|Σ|. uunionsq
Hence, immediately by Lemmas 4 and 5:
Theorem 3. For each ϕ ∈ Fml♦: |=GS5C ϕ iff |=GFS5C ϕ iff ϕ is valid in all
universal GFS5C-models M where |WM|+ |TM| ≤ 2(`(ϕ) + 2).
Finally, to check non-deterministically if a formula ϕ ∈ Fml♦ is not GS5C-
valid, it suffices, using Lemmas 4 and 5, to guess a universal GFS5C-model M
with |WM| = `(ϕ) and values in U = {0, 1`(ϕ)2+1 , . . . , `(ϕ)
2
`(ϕ)2+1 , 1} and then to
guess a world x ∈ WM and check whether VM(ϕ, x) < 1. This means choosing
`(ϕ)|Var(ϕ)| values in U for VM and also a subset of U for TM. Choosing these
values and the world x ∈ WM and then computing the value of VM(ϕ, x) = 1
can be achieved in time polynomial in `(ϕ)2. So validity in GS5C is in co-NP.
Since checking validity in Go¨del logic is co-NP hard (see, e.g., [11]), we obtain:
Theorem 4. Validity in GS5C and the one-variable fragment of first-order Go¨del
logic is decidable and indeed co-NP-complete.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have established the decidability of validity in the Go¨del modal
logics GK and GKC based, respectively, on fuzzy and crisp Kripke frames. We
have also established decidability and co-NP completeness for validity in the
one-variable fragment of first-order Go¨del logic and, equivalently, the logic GS5C
based on crisp Kripke frames where accessibility is an equivalence relation. In
ongoing work, we aim to determine the complexity of validity in GK and GKC
(both of which we conjecture to be PSPACE complete), possibly via Gentzen-
style proof systems. We also intend to extend our approach to other logics. From
a modal perspective, we plan to consider logics with multiple modalities (in
particular, Go¨del description logics) and modalities whose accessibility relations
satisfy conditions such as reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Moreover, in
the propositional setting, we intend to treat modal logics based on so-called
“projective logics” (see [1]) where similar methods should apply.
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